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Abstract
This paper presents a new theory that explains why developing countries have been entering
into Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) in the last 50 years. It disputes Andrew Guzman’s account
which depicts the BIT generation as a result of a prisoner’s dilemma among developing countries.
As explained here, the BIT “game” differs from a prisoner’s dilemma in two key ways. First, the
BIT game has a sequential/evolutionary nature, stemming from the fact that developing countries
have been joining (and rejecting) the network at various times since 1959. Second, unlike the
prisoner’s dilemma, the BIT system demonstrates the positive externalities or network effects of
having one system of treaties defined in closely similar terms. Taking into account those two
differences, a new theory may be presented: the BIT generation as a virtual network.
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1.

Introduction: Why Do Developing Countries Sign BITs?

From 1959, when Germany and Pakistan concluded the first bilateral
investment treaty, to 2005, the number of BITs has grown globally to 2495.1
With the intention of increasing the inflow of foreign direct investment
(FDI), developing countries have massively embarked on an ongoing project
to conclude these treaties with developed countries, and also among
themselves.2 As a result, at the beginning of the 21st century, we are
witnessing the development of a structural pillar of the new world order: the
BIT generation.3
*

JSD, Yale Law School. Associate at Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP. The opinions expressed herein are
those of the author, and do not represent the opinions of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP or its clients.

1

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 26 (2006).
About 70% of them are currently in effect.
2

See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second Wave, 14 MICH. J. INT’L L.
621 (1993) and Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their
Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24 INT’L L. 655 (1990). See also a list of BITs in
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES IN THE
MID-1990S (1998). A more recent list, though incomplete, is available at the UNCTAD website
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch____779.aspx (last visited Dec. 13, 2005).
3

The expression was coined by W. Michael Reisman & Robert D. Sloane, Indirect Takings and its
Valuations in the BIT Generation, 74 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 115 (2003).
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The BIT generation is a network of treaties that are very similar,
though not identical. The network grew from 265 treaties in mid-1987, to
700 in 1994, 1857 in 1999,4 and finally, to the current size of nearly 2500
treaties at the end of 2005. These treaties regulate the admission, treatment
and expropriation of foreign investment, as well as the settlement of
disputes. The common legal architecture of BITs is straightforward. Host
states commit themselves to providing a stable regulatory system aimed at
the protection of investments, including in most cases the provision of fair
and equitable treatment, full protection and security, treatment no less
favorable than that provided to nationals or to third-state nationals, and no
direct or indirect expropriation without proper compensation.
A quick comparison of the treaties that form this pool reveals two
characteristics which, though crucial for understanding the emergence of the
BIT generation, have been somewhat overlooked by scholars and
commentators. The first of these is that BITs are written using extremely
broad and open-ended concepts. BIT language resembles constitutional
language, and it is no exaggeration to state that BITs represent actual
Economic Constitutions for foreign investors doing business in countries
that have adopted them. More importantly, not only do BITs contain specific
“constitutional” provisions that favor foreign investors, but they also give
original “constitutional” jurisdiction to arbitral tribunals, thereby replacing
domestic courts.
The second, somewhat underreported feature of BITs is that they are
all worded in more or less the same terms.5 As one French commentator
4

See UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 67 (1988), RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES xii and 267-326
(1995), and UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES 1959-1999 at 1 (2000) (available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf, last visited
Aug. 4, 2006).
5

Not many commentators have realized this fact. Among those who noted the similarity between BITs, see
DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 4, xii, Calvin A. Hamilton & Paula I. Rochwerger, Trade and Investment:
Foreign Direct Investment Through Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties, 18 N.Y. INT´L L. REV. 1, 8 (2005),
and Vaughan Lowe, Regulation or Expropriation, 55 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 447, 451 (2002). Already in
1987, Eileen Denza & Shelag Brooks, Investment Protection Treaties: United Kingdom Experience, 36
INT’L L. & COMP. L. Q. 908, 913 (1987) commented that “nearly 300 treaties now exist worldwide—
broadly similar in character, content, and standards, although there are important national differences in
emphasis and detail. The effect has been to create an infrastructure of agreements based on realistic
accommodations rather than political rhetoric, and to provide important support for those standards of
customary international law which had seemed to be slipping away.”
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remarks, “whilst these treaties are signed during different periods of time
and with different states, they remain similar in content. Numerous
provisions of these treaties are identical. They use specific investment law
vocabulary,”6 citing notions such as “fair and equitable treatment,”
“expropriation,” “measures tantamount to expropriation,” “fork in the road,”
and “umbrella clauses.”7 Similarly, Douglas points out that “the striking
feature of this collection of model BITs [published by UNCTAD, models
used by different States that Douglas considers a representative sample of all
BITs] is that their formal layout and substantive content are very similar,
often practically identical.”8 We have witnessed de facto standardization, in
which all countries have adopted more or less the same basic treaty.
The combination of these two aspects means that BIT interpretation is
giving rise to a genuine constitutional jurisprudence, by which I mean a
process of judicial norm-creation that gives actual specific content to the
overly general provisions of the treaties. What Stone Sweet has observed in
other contexts of supranational adjudication perfectly fits the situation of
BITs: “[j]ust inevitably, judges who enforce such standards [balancing,
proportionality, ‘least-means’ tests, and in general, incomplete or relational
“contracts”] behave as relatively pure policymakers, in that they use their
discretion to evaluate and control the law-making of others.”9 We can thus
see how, since the first arbitral award was rendered in 1990,10 BIT case law
has gradually become its own distinct field of international law. This has
resulted in “the establishment of a genuine arbitration case law specific to
the field of investment.”11
This paper focuses on the descriptive side of the BIT revolution.
Salacuse & Sullivan pose the relevant questions in very precise terms: “Why
6

Pierre Duprey, Do Arbitral Awards Constitute Precedents? Should Commercial Arbitration Be
Distinguished from Arbitration Based on Investment Treaties, in TOWARDS A UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION LAW? 251, 276 (Emmanuel Gaillard ed., 2005).
7

Id.

8

Zachary Douglas, The Hybrid Foundation of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 74 BRIT. Y. B. INT’L L. 151,
159 (2004).
9

ALEC STONE SWEET, THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 119 (2004).

10

See Asian Agric. Prod. Ltd. v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3 (June 27, 1990).

11

Duprey, supra note 6, 276-77.
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would developing countries enter into such agreements? Why would they
constrain their sovereignty by entering into treaties that specifically limit
their ability to take necessary legislative and administrative actions to
advance and protect their national interests?”12 These questions are of
particular importance for Latin America, a region that defended the Calvo
Doctrine —developed by Andres Bello in 1832— and the Calvo Clause —a
Latin American practice that actually predated Calvo— for more than 150
years.13 As one commentator ironically notes, “no region of the world has so
completely moved from a principle-based rejection of any international role
in the protection of foreign investment, to its near wholesale acceptance as
reflected in the signing of investment treaties”.14
At present, Andrew Guzman has offered one of the best-articulated
explanations for the emergence of the BIT generation, which he later refined
in a piece written together with Elkins and Simmons (hereinafter, EGS). In
Guzman’s account, the current situation, in which thousands of BITs exist, is
the result of a prisoner’s dilemma among developing countries in which
these countries, competing against each other to attract foreign direct
investment (FDI), have all ended up worse off.15
This paper presents a different theory of what transpired in the last
fifty years. While acknowledging the existence of competition between
developing countries to attract FDI, as well as the problem of collective
action, it disputes the idea that the BIT generation must be explained as a
prisoner’s dilemma. This work claims, as some legal and game theory

12

Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral
Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L. J. 67, 77 (2005).
13

See Frank Griffith Dawson, The Influence of Andres Bello on Latin-American Perceptions of the NonIntervention and State Responsibility, 57 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 253 et seq (1987).

14

Carlos G. Garcia, All the Other Dirty Little Secrets: Investment Treaties, Latin America, and the
Necessary Evil of Investor-State Arbitration, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 301, 318 (2004).

15

Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 651 (1997-1998); and Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman and
Beth Simmons, Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, 60
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 811 (2006). This article circulated before through the internet; see,
Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000 (May 2005), AMERICAN
LAW & ECONOMICS ASSOCIATION ANNUAL MEETINGS. AMERICAN LAW & ECONOMICS ASSOCIATION 15TH
ANNUAL MEETING, Working Paper 31, available at http://law.bepress.com/alea/15th/bazaar/art31 (last
visited July 14, 2005).
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experts have also warned, that Guzman and EGS have identified the
situation “too quickly with a prisoner’s dilemma.”16
In fact, the BIT “game” differs from a prisoner’s dilemma in two key
respects. First, it has a sequential/evolutionary nature, stemming from the
fact that developing countries have been joining (and rejecting) the network
at various times since 1959. Indeed, from 1959 on, developing countries
have been constantly confronted with the decision of whether or not to adopt
the BIT program.17 Second, unlike the prisoner’s dilemma, the BIT system
demonstrates the positive externalities or network effects of having one
system of treaties defined in closely similar terms. Taking into account those
two differences, a new theory emerges: the BIT generation as a virtual
network.
The
BIT
system
bears
remarkable
similarity
to
a
sequential/evolutionary collective action game. The most notable of these
similarities is the fact that the common language contained in BITs has
become a de facto standard. As mentioned, over the course of nearly half a
century, most countries have adopted treaties containing the same or very
similar provisions. My claim here is that network externalities (represented,
in brief, by the players’ anticipation that of a future BIT-case law will be
created by arbitral tribunals) explain this de facto standardization. At the
same time, the externalities support my most serious contention with
Guzman and EGS’s theory: that the equilibrium represented by BITs is not
the worst-case scenario for developing countries.
This new theory intends to answer four crucial questions left
unanswered by Guzman’s and EGS’ account. First, why did all developing
countries adopt more or less the same rules; that is, why did such a high
level of uniformity prevail? Second, why did developing countries adopt the
particular set of rules that we see today in BITs as opposed to others, be they
more favorable or unfavorable for host states? Third, why did those rules
exist in the “market” for more than 20 years without being widely adopted?
16

DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER, & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY
(1994).

AND THE

LAW 188

17

In fact, EGS, supra nota 15, 821, present evidence that the decision of whether or not to sign BITs is
typically the decision of whether or not to adopt the BIT program, that is, the decision to conclude BITs on
a systematic basis. I refer to this phenomenon as “joining the BIT network”.
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And, fourth, why did the standard BIT rules constitute a suboptimal
equilibrium, i.e., why did States not erode all rents when concluding BITs?
This paper proceeds as follows. Section I presents Guzman’s and, to a
lesser degree, EGS’ theory. Section II summarizes the two basic ideas
underpinning the new theory presented here: weak competition among
countries and network effects. Section III presents a formal model of the BIT
Generation as a virtual network. Section IV provides evidence, and Section
V tries to answer the key questions that any theory addressing the BIT
generation must consider. The conclusions remark upon some of the
normative implications of the new virtual network theory. In contrast to the
prisoners’ dilemma model, this new theory posits that developing countries
may actually end up better off.

2.

The BIT Generation as a Prisoner’s Dilemma

The first BIT was concluded between Germany and Pakistan in
1959, and the ICSID Convention came into force on October 14, 1966.19
Both treaties came into being during the darkest days of “international
minimum standards”20 and international arbitration,21 including the Hull
Rule (“prompt, adequate, and effective compensation”).22 Yet, the BIT
treaties and ICSID Convention went more or less unnoticed until the second
half of the 1980s, when the BIT generation began to emerge. In any case, the
18

18

See Treaty for Promotion and Protection of Investment, Nov. 25, 1959, West Germany-Pakistan, 457
U.N.T.S. 23.
19

The ICSID or Washington Convention is the shorter name for the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, Mar.
18, 1965. It came into force on October 14, 1966.

20

There is ample literature that discusses the conflict between the “national treatment” standard and the
“international minimum” standards. See the following classic works: EDWIN M. BORCHARD, THE
DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD; OR, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 792 (1915),
Edwin Borchard, The ‘Minimum Standard’ of the Treatment of Aliens, 33 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 51, 55
(1939), ALWYN V. FREEMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR DENIAL OF JUSTICE
(1938), CLYDE EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 107 (1928) y
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL (RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW SERIES), THE LAW OF RESPONSIBILITY OF
STATES FOR DAMAGE DONE IN THEIR TERRITORY TO THE PERSON OR PROPERTY OF FOREIGNERS (1929).
21

See Richard Lillich, The Current Status of the Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 7-8 (Richard Lillich ed., 1983).

22

See the letter from Secretary of State Cordell Hull to the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs during
1938, reprinted in 3 G.H. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 655-65 (1940).
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phenomenal pace at which BITs proliferated is already well-documented,
and a good summary of it can be found elsewhere.23 I will simply present
this graph as proof of the impressive rate at which BITs have been
concluded in the last twenty years:
Figure 1: BITs concluded between 1959 and 2003

Source: Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase
Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries 11 (42) (2005))

As mentioned in the introduction, Guzman explains the present
popularity of BITs in terms of a prisoner’s dilemma. In this game,
developing countries, competing against each other to increase the flow of
FDI, bid away all their benefits and, in particular, any advantages that could
have been secured under a multilateral treaty. For Guzman, the formerly
collaborative dynamic among developing countries that had prevailed during
the 1960s and 1970s —represented mainly by the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States (CERDS), enacted by the General Assembly of

23

See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES
1959-1999 at 1 (2000)), Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign
Direct Investment to Developing Countries 11 (2005), and UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT, RESEARCH NOTE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS
2 (2005).
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the U.N. in 197424— was destroyed, because it was now in the best interest
of each individual state to defect and sign BITs.
The core of his theory is the identification of a collective action
problem. In this game, “an individual country has a strong incentive to
negotiate with and offer concessions to potential investors; thereby making
itself a more attractive location relative to other potential hosts,”25 but where
“developing countries as a group are likely to benefit from forcing investors
to enter contracts with host countries that cannot be enforced in an
international forum, thereby giving the host a much greater ability to extract
value from the investment.”26 He sees developing countries as a potential
cartel: “developing countries as a group have sufficient market power in the
‘sale’ of their resources that they stand to gain more when they act
collectively than when they compete against one another.”27 In the end,
“BITs increase global efficiency, [but] they likely reduce the overall welfare
of developing states.”28
In Guzman’s opinion, less developed countries [LDCs] face a
prisoner’s dilemma. It is in the best interest of LDC, as a group, to reject the
Hull Rule, but individually “each individual LDC is better off ‘defecting’
from the group by signing a BIT that gives it an advantage over other LDCs
in the competition to attract foreign investors.”29 Assuming that the “market”
for FDI is perfect, developing countries compete for larger portions of that
FDI, and this competition comes at the expense of other developing
countries (assuming a fixed pool of investment).30 In that highly competitive
24

The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc A/9631
(1975), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251 (1975).

25

Guzman, supra note 15, 643.

26

Id.

27

Id.

28

Id.

29

Id. at 666-667.

30

Id. at 670 and 674. He states this condition in the following terms: “[Guzman’s theoretical claims] are
true only if the flow of investment into LDCs as a group is relatively insensitive to the terms on which that
investment is made as compared to the flow of investment into a single developing country. In economic
terms, the demand for resources of LDCs as a group must be relatively inelastic while the demand for the
resources of a single country must be elastic” (Id. at 674-75).
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environment, the results for developing countries are unfavorable because
“the potential hosts will continue to bid against one another until the benefit
enjoyed by the host from the investment is zero.”31
By contrast, in a world of collective action, all developing countries
would be better off by colluding, and adhering to customary international
law rules such as those contained in CERDS. In the absence of BITs, host
countries can extract value from irreversible investment made by foreign
investors, by unilaterally changing the conditions under which the firms
operate.32 However, “[t]he disadvantage of CERDS, however, is that there
will be fewer investments because of the inefficiencies of the regime
[CERDS] make it more costly to invest.”33
Whether the net result of moving from CERDS to BITs is positive or
negative is uncertain, but the critical issue here is the sensitivity of
investment in relation to its costs. In other words, “[i]f the level of
investment dropped below a certain point, LDCs would be worse off as a
group under the CERDS regime that they would be under a BIT regime. On
the other hand, if there is only a small reduction in the overall level of
investment, LDCs may be better off under CERDS because they can receive
a larger share of the return from investments.”34
Although Guzman recognizes that a definitive answer will require
empirical information not yet available,35 he provides various arguments that
make the CERDS case, prima facie, the better scenario for developing
countries.36 In his opinion, developing countries as a group “may be better
off in a regime that leaves them unable to enter binding contracts with

31

Id. at 671. He insists that “as in any competitive market, the seller — here the host country — will
receive no economic profit. The entire profit will be enjoyed by the investor” (Id. at 672). Nevertheless, in
a footnote, he accepts that the winner will not need to bid away all benefits in cases in which countries are
not identical among them in nature and characteristics (Id. at 672 n.103).
32

Id. at 673.

33

Id.

34

Id. at 673-4.

35

Id. at 674 et seq.

36

Id.
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investors.”37 His main argument follows along these lines: As in the case of
a cartel, developing countries acting together to support CERDS could have
kept all rents, or at least a larger share of them, for themselves.38 Collective
action could have secured monopoly rents by using the market power that is
essential to the cartel.39
In the later EGS’ work, the prisoner’s dilemma scenario is
significantly softened, as they opt just to stress the competitive origins of the
BIT generation. The authors remain in fact silent on the issue of the
prisoner’s dilemma.40 According to EGS, BITs are signed, most
significantly, to “make credible commitments because they raise the ex post
costs of noncompliance above those that might be incurred in the absence of
the treaty.”41 Notwithstanding the tautology of explaining a contract or treaty
as a credible commitment device,42 the use of game theory language permits
EGS to highlight the strength of BITs, whose investor-state arbitration
serves as the “teeth” for enforcement. This institutional design, hence,
increases the ex post costs involved in the violation of BITs, including
diplomatic costs, arbitration costs, reputation costs, and sovereignty costs.43
The collective action problem is still present in this second paper, but
depicted in different terms. Acting individually, countries receive
37

Id. Guzman assumes that without BITs, there are no contracts in international law. One possible
explanation is that Guzman considers the New International Economic Order (NIEO) to have been, at some
point of time, jus cogens in international law. But that is a claim that has been rejected in international law
and which only a very small number of commentators would agree with. See e.g. F.V. GARCÍA-AMADOR,
EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL DEL DESARROLLO. UNA NUEVA DIMENSIÓN DEL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL
ECONÓMICO 251 (1987), and its rejection by an international law tribunal in the Aminoil Case, in The
Government of the State of Kuwait v. The American Independent Oil Company, Final Award, (1982),
reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 976, 1021 (1982).
38

Guzman, supra note 15, 683.

39

Id. at 677.

40

They just say that “collectively, they might be better off resisting the demands of investors (avoiding the
sovereignty costs described above), but individually, it is rational to sign, in hopes of stimulating capital
inflows.” (Id.).

41

EGS, supra note 15, 823.

42

People make contracts because they need to commit themselves credibly. Explaining contracts as a
credible commitment, then, does not add any new information. The relevant question is why people make
credible commitments; here, why countries conclude BITs.

43

EGS, supra note 15, 824.
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reputational advantages that may allow them to attract more FDI, investment
which would otherwise have gone to other developing countries. However,
signing BITs involves costs for the host government, the majority of which
the authors characterize as “sovereignty costs.” These include “the political
costs of assembling a coalition in support of foreign investors’ rights, as well
as the costs associated with giving up a broad range of policy instruments
relevant to domestic social or developmental purposes (taxation, regulation,
performance requirements, property seizure, currency and capital
restrictions.)”44 But most importantly, they include the costs associated with
delegating adjudicative authority to international arbitral tribunals.45
If developing countries believed that the benefits of signing these
treaties outweighed these sovereignty costs, EGS argue, they were wrong:
“in many cases, the answer is no.”46 The writers do not provide any deeper
explanation or empirical justification for the collective action problem. But
Guzman’s original account seems to be present here, however implicitly.
While defection is still a dominant strategy for developing countries, the
more that sign BITs according to their individual interests, the more any
benefits of defection tend to be cancelled out. Assuming a limited pool of
foreign investment, the benefits of defection eventually disappear entirely,
and all former members of the cartel are left with “sovereignty costs.”
In the end, the competition created by this situation —i.e., “a
competitive dynamic among potential hosts to reduce the risks and enhance
the profitability of investing”47— makes developing countries, as a group,
worse off. Competition is responsible for this outcome: “the diffusion of
BITs —and the liberal property rights regime they embody— are propelled
in good part by the competition among potential host countries for credible
property rights protections that direct investors require.”48

44

Id. at 825.

45

Id.

46

Id.

47

Id. at 823.

48

Id. at 812.
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Weak Competition and Network Effects

The theory that this paper advances asserts that the success of BITs is
better explained using the model of a sequential/evolutionary game
characterized by network effects. It is a well-known fact that network effects
create several collective action problems.49 The sequential decisionmaking
structure of these games clearly distinguishes them from a prisoner’s
dilemma, in which non-cooperative forces lead the parties to adopt the worst
possible solution.
However, before explaining the theory as such, two concepts need to
be reviewed in this section: first, competition among States, and second,
network externalities. The model described in this paper does not assume
strong competition among developing countries. States are not and do not
behave as firms. Competition for FDI is a highly distorted process under any
market-based account, thus any model based on strong competition is
necessarily a flawed representation of reality. As Bell & Parchomovsky
remind us in their recent study about U.S. states’ competition in property
law, the supply side of government services is far more complicated than
any idealized market representation:
A variety of political institutions, most importantly elected legislative
bodies, produce property laws. These bodies, in turn, are staffed by
decisionmakers who ideally have no direct pecuniary interest in the
legislative outcome, but who often seek to maximize ideological
preferences, personal reputation, reelection opportunities, and other
political rents, sometimes at the expense of state profits or the public
welfare. The agency problem that plagues corporate law thus expresses
itself even more sharply in the political context.50

49

BAIRD (et. al.), supra note 16, 208.

50

Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Federalism, 115 YALE L. J. 72, 98 (2005). See
also, Robert T. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An
Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L. J. 356, 363 (2005) (analyzing state competition
in trust funds regulation in the U.S.) (“On a theoretical level, our findings are relevant to the ongoing
scholarly debate over the nature of jurisdictional competition. Our findings not only contradict the simple,
state-revenue-based model but also cast doubt on recent high-profile work that, by showing a lack of tax
revenue from attracting new business, questions the existence of the phenomenon.”).
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In any case, any account which is purely based on perfect market
competition is an incomplete representation of the BIT phenomenon, one
that fails to answer too many important questions, including those identified
in the introduction of this paper. By contrast, the network theory of the BIT
generation does not assume such a form of State competition. While it
accepts the fact that countries have competed for FDI, it depicts this
competition as a “weak” version of the classic market-based process. Indeed,
in a weak competition model, developing countries who wish to attract FDI
are interested in signaling their commitment to property rights and the rule
of law, but only up to a certain point, and subject to all the distortions of the
political process.51 In this context, competition may only partially explain
why countries accept rules that, prima facie, are not “favorable” to them, and
that would never have been adopted in the absence of those competitive
forces.
In addition to weak competition, the theory developed here relies on
the notion of network effects and, more precisely, on the previous
applications of that idea in the field of corporate law, particularly in the
context of States’ competition for corporate charters in the U.S.52 Network
effects —also referred to as “bandwagon effects”— is an economic concept
describing those markets in which the utility derived from the consumption
of a good or service increases, as more users consume the same good or
service.53 Network effects are positive consumption externalities.54 They are
external demand-side scale economies arising from the fact that the number
of users who demand a product or service increases the future number of
51

See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARRANGEMENTS (UNCTAD SERIES ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
POLICIES FOR DEVELOPMENT) 7 (2005) (available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20053_en.pdf, last
visited Jan. 21, 2006) (“The signing of a BIT has the effect of signaling that a country wishes to provide a
stable, transparent and predictable investment environment in which investments can thrive — an effect
independent of whether the BIT is actually in force. In other words, signing is signaling — enforcing is
another matter. However, the longer the BIT remains not ratified, the weaker that signal becomes.”).
52

See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Network of Contracts, 61 Va. L. Rev. 757
(1995). For a general analysis of network effects and the law, see Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan,
Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 491 (1998).
53

See Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition and Compatibility, in 75
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 424, 424 (1985) (“The utility that a given user derives from the good
depends upon the number of other users who are in the same ‘network’ as is he or she.”).
54

Robert B. Ahdieh, Making Markets: Networks Effects and the Role of Law in the Creation of Strong
Securities Markets, 76 S. Cal. L. Rev. 277, 288 (2003).
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users.55 Each consumer who decides to buy the product affects the decision
of the rest, increasing the utility that the latter would derive from consuming
the same good.56 The most typical examples of network products are
telephones and faxes, where the individual products lack any inherent value
outside the physical network. Other typical examples are computers and
their operative systems and typewriter standards (such as QWERTY),
among others, which form “virtual networks”: here the products have
inherent value, but their total worth appears only when bound to a group of
people using the same standard.
Networks effects produce considerable distortions within standard
microeconomic models of competition. They may even lead to market
failure. Products that have network effects “have dynamics that differ from
those of conventional products and services. They are quite difficult to get
started and often end up in a ditch before they can get under way. Once
enough consumers have gotten on a bandwagon, however, it may be
unstoppable.”57 These products are especially prone to “tipping” or de facto
standardization, “which is the tendency of one system to pull away from its
rivals in popularity once it has gained an initial edge.”58 For the same
reasons, once a product has become the dominant standard in the market,
accrued network externalities lend it an advantage over newly introduced
innovations.59 Changing such a product would be costly “because new
relation-specific investments have to be made. In such a situation, systems
that are expected to be popular —and thus have widely available
components— will be more popular for that very reason.”60

55

JEFFREY H. ROHLFS, BANDWAGON EFFECTS IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES 20-21 (2001).

56

Ahdieh, supra note 54, 298.

57

ROHLFS, supra note 55, 4.

58

Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro, System Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 106
(1994).
59

See Klausner, supra note 52, 791.

60

Katz & Shapiro, supra note 58, 94. See also, BAIRD, supra note 16, 212 (“In products with network
externalities, the size of the installed customer base matters a great deal, and, as the formal analysis
suggested above, a consumer may reject a new, superior product because a network already exists for the
old one.”).
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These products display lock-in effects —also called “inertia”61 or
“excess inertia”62— that enables them to outsell competitors even in the
event that those competitors are inherently superior. As Rohlfs explains, “the
best product does not necessarily win the bandwagon effect. On the contrary,
if an inferior product for any reason gets an early edge in number of
customers, it may well win the race.”63 That is, “once one option has enough
of a head start, superior technological alternatives may never get the chance
to develop.”64 Alternative products that fail to infiltrate the market may have
yielded to a more efficient equilibrium.65
This means that in the presence of network effects, an equilibrium
may not exist or multiple equilibria may exist,66 but regardless, nobody can
assure that the optimal result will be reached.67 An important consequence is
that, as Katz & Shapiro remark, if someone is trying to explain the actual
equilibrium reached by a product with network effects, “one would like to
have a theory that includes the factors that lead to one outcome or the other.”
68
The same idea is endorsed by Peyton, according to whom “equilibrium
can be understood only within a dynamic framework that explains how it
comes about (if in fact it does).”69 Moreover, as David posits, “any
economist who would explain the particular equilibrium outcome (among

61

See H. PEYTON YOUNG, INDIVIDUAL STRATEGY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 15 (1998) (“Thus, from a short
perspective, a key property of the system is its inertia, that is, the expected waiting time until the process
tips from the less favorable to the more favorable regime.”).

62

See Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standarization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON.
70, 71 (1985) (“‘[E]xcess inertia] impedes the collective switch from a common standard or technology to a
possibly superior new standard or technology.”). See also, BAIRD, supra note 16, 209.
63

ROHLFS, supra note 55, 43.

64

AVINASH DIXIT & BARRY NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY 238 (1991).

65

PEYTON, supra note 61, 14.

66

See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 58, 94.

67

See Brett H. McDonnell, Getting Stuck, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 681, 704-5 (2003). See also, Paul A. David,
Path Dependence, its critics and the quest for ‘historical economics’, 9 (available at
http://129.3.20.41/eps/eh/papers/0502/0502003.pdf, last visited Aug. 23, 2006). See also his seminal work
on the subject, Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332 (1985).
68

Katz & Shapiro, supra note 58, 96-7.

69

PEYTON, supra note 61, 4.
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the multiplicity of eligible candidates) towards which this system converges
must necessarily have recourse to the historical details of its evolution.”70
The first detailed application of network effects to the field of law was
put forth by Michael Klausner in a groundbreaking article about corporate
law’s role as a virtual network of contracts.71 The core concept of Klausner’s
theory is that corporate contracts, if worded using the same terms, form
networks. These contracts “have network externality qualities, and the firms
that use a particular contract term form a ‘network’ analogous to the network
of PC users. Unlike a telephone network, where units are physically
connected, a contractual network (like a PC network) is linked together by
commonly used complementary products.”72
According to Klausner, when a contract clause or term is widely used,
many factors contribute to elevate its value, all of which share in common at
least one thing: they enhance predictability, one of the core attributes of the
rule of law.73 In his view:
More judicial precedents can be expected, on average, to enhance the
clarity of the term. Common business practices implementing the term
may become established, further reducing uncertainty. Legal advice,
opinion letters and related documentation will be more readily available,
more timely, less costly, and more certain. Finally, firms may find it easier
to market their securities.74

Network effects are directly tied to the vagueness and ambiguity that
is pervasive, and sometimes desirable,75 in law. On the one hand, the
70

Paul A. David, Path Dependence and the Quest for Historical Economics: One More Chorus of the
Ballad of Qwerty, 21 (available at http://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/economics/history/paper20/david3.pdf, last
visited Aug. 23, 2006).

71

Klausner, supra note 52, 761.

72

Id. at 774-5.

73

See also, McDonnell, supra note 67, 701.

74

Klausner, supra note 52, 761.

75

Vid Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983), and Louis
Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
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inherent value of a clause or legal term depends on its autonomous clarity
(i.e., textual interpretation). On the other hand, network benefits derive from
several different sources, the most important of which is the network
externalities that reduce uncertainty. The more firms that adopt the same
charter term, the more the term will be litigated, and therefore, the more
future judicial interpretations will be provided.76 In other words, “the
expected quantity and frequency of judicial interpretations is positively
related to the number of firms that adopt the term. Thus, to the extent that
future judicial interpretations are beneficial, they are network benefits
associated with particular corporate contract terms.”77 Hence, a substantial
source of value for the term lies in future interpretations.78
Alec Stone Sweet, in the context of judicial governance, also provides
valuable insights that may be applied here.79 He focuses more specifically on
the network effects of litigation and judicial lawmaking. Stone Sweet argues
that legal institutions and adjudication are “fundamentally conditioned by
how earlier legal disputes in that area of the law have been sequenced and
resolved.”80 An essential element in his account is the existence of “some
minimally robust conception of precedent.”81 Stone Sweet describes his
theory in the following terms:
How courts typically operate and how legal actors typically behave are
likely to provoke and then sustain the path dependent development of
litigation and judicial rule-making. Given some underlying notion of
precedent, these processes can be expected to exhibit some significant
degree of randomness (through the vagaries of sequencing) and nonergodicity (through the survival of rules announced in past rulings); and
judicial rule-making can be expected to provoke positive feedback effects
—more litigation and the construction of litigation networks— and to
76

See Klausner, supra note 52, 776.

77

Id.

78

Id. at 778. Past decisions are not network effects, but learning effects (“past” with respect to the date of
adoption of the term by the party).
79

See Alec Stone Sweet, Path Dependency, Precedent, and Judicial Power, in MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC
STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, AND JUDICIALIZATION 112 et seq (2002).
80

Id. at 113.

81

Id. at 118 (emphasis on the original).
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move the law along paths that are relatively inflexible, that is, costly or
impossible to reverse.82

As shown in the following figure, Stone Sweet’s starting point is that
legal norms are essentially indeterminate, and all bodies of law are imperfect
and incomplete (point ID in the figure).83 But legal reasoning has the precise
power, through analogy, to create doctrinal or argumentation frameworks,
i.e. “discursive structures that organize (1) how parties to a legal dispute as
questions of judges and engage one another’s respective arguments, and (2)
how courts frame their decisions.”84 These doctrines and frameworks reduce
the degree of indeterminacy of legal norms. According to the author, “by
formalizing the results of analogic reasoning into precedents. . . judges give
the legal system a measure of ‘relative determinacy’.”85 More precisely,
“judicial rule-making, being more or less authoritative, should function to
reduce uncertainty about the nature and scope of the standard, and also to
provoke and reinforce feedback effects.”86 The outcome is that, over time,
we move from ID towards AD:
Figure 2: Stone Sweet’s propagation of argumentation frameworks

82

Id. at 120-121.

83

Id. at 122.

84

Id. at 124.

85

Id. See also, Id. (“Prior legal decisions constitute the materials that enable the construction of such
frameworks. Legal systems are webs or clusters of relatively autonomous argumentation frameworks.”).

86

Id. at 117.
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In any case, future interpretation of ambiguous language is not the
only bandwagon externality that a network of contracts may display. First,
certain common business practices also constitute network externalities, as
in the case of future precedents, by reducing uncertainty. The assumption
here is that the more firms use a given contract term, “the larger, and
possibly more varied, the base of common practice will be.”87
Second, legal services and an experienced judiciary are crucial
sources of externalities. “The legal services available for a commonly used
term may be superior, either in terms of cost or quality, to those provided for
a less commonly used term.”88 Once a term is adopted, firms need not
expend money in drafting and negotiation costs. The costs of research and
interpretation of a term are also reduced when the term is widely used.89
Similarly, with a commonly used term, the judiciary will become more
experienced and be able to decide cases in an expedient and well-considered
way.90 Firms can trust that future decisions will be consistent and correct.
Third, there are marketing externalities. Firms need to attract
shareholders and bondholders to analyze and price the new stocks. A
common term may permit investors and securities analysts to estimate the
value of the firm’s securities through routine financial analysis, at relatively
low cost.91 In contrast, an idiosyncratic or uncommon term will be priced in
a manner reflecting the uncertainty and lack of knowledge that is associated
with it, and the costs of pricing services will be higher. In consequence, “the
cost of capital for firms that use common charter terms may be lower than
the cost for those that use uncommon terms.”92

87

Klausner, supra note 52, 780.

88

Id. at 782.

89

See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 274-75 (1985).

90

See McDonnell, supra note 67, 703-4.

91

Klausner, supra note 52, 785.

92

Id.
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4. A Formal Model of the BIT Generation as a Virtual
Network
The theory of the BIT generation as a virtual network rests on a fairly
simple idea: there are economies of scale in having a global regime of
treaties worded in near-identical terms, particularly when those terms are as
broad as the ones contained in BITs. In this Section, I will provide a formal
model for this theory.
This model uses as one of its starting point an important assumption
regarding the different credibility and commitments mechanisms available
for developing countries. Considering that developing countries are
reasonably interested in attracting FDI and in protecting property rights, I
assume here that the following ranking is decreasing in sovereignty costs for
all given levels of investment (i.e., investment is a constant). These costs
that include, in summary, loss of governmental regulatory power over
internal economic activity, and the loss of jurisdiction by domestic tribunals:
•

Only domestic law remedies plus customary international law
(state of affairs before the emergence of the BIT generation). This
means, essentially, no international forum in which to litigate
investment disputes, which are therefore left to domestic courts
and diplomatic protection under customary international law.93

•

BIT-like-minus treaties, that is, treaties with standards less
convenient to foreign investors, worded in terms different from
those actually used in BITs;

•

BITs as we know them today;

•

BIT-like-plus treaties, that is, treaties with standards more
convenient to foreign investors, worded in terms different from
those actually used in BITs;

•

Tailor-made contracts that fully extract all rents, containing ICSID
arbitration clauses. This category may include BITs that contain

93

In contrast to Guzman, I do not consider CERDS to be the best alternative for developing countries.
Instead, I assume that the best option for developing countries in terms of sovereignty costs is for them
simply to retain full control over their own domestic legal systems and institutions, signaling their
commitment to property rights using domestic constitutional and public law.
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umbrella clauses, clearly the category of BITs most harmful in
terms of “sovereignty costs.”94

The formal model of network externalities I am following here tries to
explain the jump from the first to the third —i.e., the emergence of the BIT
Generation— and was created by Farrell & Saloner.95 The game has two
players/countries. There is one original standard (X), which faces
competition from a new one (Y). Adapting the model to our case, it can be
said that the use of domestic law plus customary international law is the old
standard (X), and the emergence of BITs, the new competing standard (Y).
In this game, at time t1, players can switch to the new standard (an
irreversible decision) or stay with the older; at time t2, those who stayed with
the old standard may decide to switch to the new one. Each player is
uncertain of whether the other would follow if he switched (incomplete
information). A particularly important assumption for our purpose is that
because of network effects, it is better for both parties to be under the same
standard. Both parties are better off together in X, or in Y, than they would
be if one were under each standard. If Bi(a,U) is the benefit function of each
country, where i represents the type of country according to its
political/legal/cultural preferences, and a the number of countries adopting
standard U —be it X or Y— then Bi(2,X) > Bi(1,X) and Bi(2,Y) > Bi(1,Y).
The latter assumption means that even in the case that the first country
to sign a BIT captures a higher proportion of FDI, the net benefits are
smaller than if the two countries had joined the system together. This is due
to the presence of network effects. In other words, network benefits are
assumed to be higher than the net benefits associated with any extra
FDI/sovereignty costs that a country can induce/bear from being the first and
lone mover.96 The idea underlying this assumption is that the inherent value
of BITs is much lower than normally regarded; the first treaty is merely an
94

Guzman’s theory, supra note 15, 655 and 680 seems to assume — incorrectly — that all BITs contain
umbrella clauses.

95

Farrell & Saloner, supra note 62, 70.

96

Not accepting this assumption see Ryan Bubb & Susan Rose-Ackerman, BITs and Bargains: Strategic
Aspects of Bilateral and Multilateral Regulation of Foreign Investment, Yale Law School, Draft, January
2006, 6, 7 and 9.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007

The Latin American and Caribbean Journal of Legal Studies

22

Vol. 2 [2007], No. 1, Article 6

esoteric document with extremely broad provisions, and nobody knows
whether it will really work, or how it will work.
As explained before, i reflects the individual country’s preferences,
where higher types of i (indexed by higher values of i) “are more eager to
switch to Y, both unilaterally and if the other firm [countries] also
switches.”97 It is possible to classify developing countries according to three
general types of i: first, those that were not interested in attracting foreign
investment, including countries that strongly preferred to protect their
sovereignty and countries that did not place too much faith in the new
standard as a means for attracting FDI (lower values of i, in the extreme
i=0);98 second, countries that urgently needed to attract foreign investment
and were therefore anxious to signal their commitment to protect foreign
property, whatever the sovereignty costs, including countries that did not
particularly value their sovereignty and countries that had high expectations
about the effectiveness of BITs for increasing FDI (higher values of i, in the
extreme, i=1); and, third, countries in the intermediate scenario, who valued
attracting foreign investment, but were sensitive to the sovereignty costs of
signing BITs and reasonably optimistic regarding their efficacy (middle
values of i).
Farrell & Saloner make a particularly interesting assumption that suits
the BIT model very well; namely, that B1(1,Y) > 0 and that B0(2,Y) <
B0(1,X). Their explanation is clear:
Unilateral switching is worthwhile for at least one possible type of firm
[country], and (at the other end of the spectrum) there are some types that
would rather remain alone with the old technology [legal standard] than
join the other firm [country] with the new technology [legal standard].
This assumption also implies that for intermediate values of i, a firm’s
[country’s] decision will at least sometimes depend on its predecessor’s
decision: this is what makes the model interesting.99

97

Farrell & Saloner, supra note 62, 76.

98

As was the case for countries involved in import substitution industrialization policies. According to Paul
C. Szasz, The Investment Disputes Convention and Latin America, 11 VA. J. INT’L L. 256, 260 (1970), “It
must be recognized that not all governments are uniformly eager to attract foreign private investment”.

99

Farrell & Saloner, supra note 62, 76.
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This means that whereas some countries were ready to sign BITs
whatever their sovereignty costs, at the same time, there were countries that
preferred to preserve the integrity of their domestic legal and political
systems and institutions at any price.
Using these assumptions, as well as some more technical ones that do
not alter the basic idea explained here, Farrell & Saloner prove that there
exists a unique “bandwagon equilibrium.”100 That is, there is a perfect
Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which each country [firms] plays the
following “bandwagon strategy”: First, if i > i*, then the country switches at
time t1. Second, if i* > i ≥ ī, then the country waits until time t2 and changes
only after observing that the other country switched at time t1. Third, if i < ī,
then the country does not move away from standard X101. This equilibrium,
in which each player follows the strategy depicted above, is shown in figure
3:
Figure 3: An illustration of Farrel & Saloner’s derivation of critical levels ī,
i0, and i* (ĩ is also included)

Source: Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standarization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16
RAND J. ECON. 70, 78 (1985) (the original graph has been simplified and slightly modified).
100

More specifically, this is represented by two symmetric bandwagon equilibria, in which the pair (ī , i*)
is the same for every player. According to Farrell & Saloner, Id. at 77, “asymmetric bandwagon equilibria
only exist for some specifications of the benefit functions, and will come in mirror-image pairs if they
occur.”

101

Id. at 76. For a full proof of the value and existence of i*, see Farrell & Saloner, id.
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The difference between the curves Bi(1,Y) and Bi(2,Y) shows the
network effects of standard Y. These benefits will be explained in full detail
in the next section, though it can be said for now that they follow the profile
suggested by Klausner in the corporate law field. Similarly, the difference
between the curves Bi(1,X) and Bi(2,X) corresponds to the network effects of
standard X. The network benefits of domestic law plus customary
international law represent the flipside of BITs. Indeed, if a country can get a
bigger slice of the FDI pie by signing BITs, then countries abandoning
domestic law plus customary international law may impose costs
(externalities) —a smaller FDI pie— on countries remaining under those
rules.102 In any case, for this theory to work, these externalities must not be
particularly large.
Before continuing with the explanation of the model’s operation, it is
necessary to stop and note the relative position of ī, i0, i*, and ĩ. First, note
that the point ī corresponds to the country which is indifferent with respect
to staying with the old standard or switching to the new one (i.e., Bī(2,Y) =
Bī(1,X)). Second, it must be emphasized that i* is located above i0. The
intuitive explanation of that relative position is that a country which is
thinking of changing at time t1 needs to obtain substantial benefits from
network effects, in order to balance the risk that the other country will not
change at time t2 because it has i < ī (an information not known by the first
country at time t1).103 Third, given the assumption of incomplete information
mentioned before, i* has a lower value than ĩ (i.e., i* < ĩ). This is a key
aspect of this model. Note that ĩ represents the point where Bĩ (1,Y) = Bi
(2,X) = 0; therefore, for values of i above ĩ the country will be better off
switching to Y in time t1, whether or not the other country follows the lead
later in time t2. Yet, for values of i between i* < ĩ (i.e., i* ≤ i < ĩ ), the
country will take the risk of switching to Y in time t1, hoping that the other
country belongs to the group that changes in time t2 (i.e., that has an i so that
ī ≤ i < i* ). According to Farrell & Saloner,
102

If BITs have inherent value, then countries signing BITs (or at least, some of them) should be able to
decrease the cost of capital and redirect some portion of FDI from the limited common pool available for
all developing countries. Then the decision of one country to abandon the standard represented by domestic
law plus customary international law imposes a negative externality over the rest of the group (a smaller
portion of FDI).
103

Farrell & Saloner, supra note 62, 77. See id., where they also formally prove that Bi*(1,Y) < 0 and
B (2,Y) > 0.
i*
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There are also some types just above i* for which Bi (1,Y) < 0 [ i.e., i* ≤ i
< ĩ ]. These types start the bandwagon rolling, but if it turns out that the
other firm was of a type below ī (so that their lead is not followed), they
regret their decision ex post. Here, again, there is straightforward intuition.
Types in this range sufficiently favor technology Y that they risk starting
the bandwagon even though they know with positive probability that they
are up against an ‘intransigent’ with type less than ī and will end up worse
off if this turns out to be so.104

Hence, given these values of ī, i0, i*, and ĩ, developing countries can
be classified according to one of the following four types (from left to right).
First, from 0 to ī: the country does not change at time t1 nor at time t2.
Second, from ī to i0: the country does not change at time t1 but changes at
time t2 if the other country already did so at time t1; however, these changes
are considered to represent a negative outcome. Third, from i0 to i*: same
scenario as b), but the country is better off under the new standard. Fourth,
from i* to ĩ: the country changes at time t1, but takes a risk because it will be
better off only if the other country changes at times t1 or t2. Fifth, above ĩ:
the country changes at time t1 and is better off whether or not the other
country changes to the new standard.
Following this framework, there are several reasons why a country
signs a BIT (standard Y). First, if a country has i > i*, then it will join the
BIT network at time t1 simply because it benefits more from the inherent
value of BITs than it would by remaining under the old standard (i > ĩ), or
because it anticipates that future countries will follow its lead (i* > i > ĩ). For
the first group, the inherent value of BITs is significant enough to justify the
change to the new standard. For the other, network effects are essential; as
noted in the previous extended citation, “[t]hese types start the bandwagon
rolling, but if it turns out that the other firm [country] was of a type below ī
(so that their lead is not followed), they regret their decision ex post.”
Second, a country may join the BIT network at time t2 after seeing
that other countries have joined it (ī ≤ i < i*). Here again, it is possible to
identify two different groups. One is comprised of countries that switch to
the new standard but would have preferred that everybody stayed in the old
104

Id. at 79.
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one (ī ≤ i < i0), and the other, of countries that find themselves better off
with the new standard (i0 < i < i*). The former group is of particular
importance, because it represents countries that switch if and only if the
other country also switches, yet would have preferred that the new
technology had not come along.105 “If polled about their intentions ex ante,
they would vehemently claim that they would not switch even if the other
switched.”106 More specifically, they would try to give the appearance of
being a country with preferences such that i < ī, in order to dissuade the
others from switching.
Third, a simpler explanation exogenous to this model should not be
rejected. Basic changes in domestic political preferences may increase the
value of i, to the point that a previously recalcitrant country finds itself under
values of i in which it will sign BITs: from below ī, to above ī, or even
above i*). The experience of China and Eastern Europe in the 1980s proves
that a country may jump from i < ī to i > i*. In fact, as it was already said, it
is difficult to deny that the emergence of the BIT generation during the late
1980s and early 1990s is linked with the fall of the Soviet Union, and
consequently, the Communist Bloc. In other words, the value of i increased
for the entire world.
It must be acknowledged that it is difficult, even impossible, to know
which of the previous reasons explains why a particular country began or did
not begin to sign BITs. Nevertheless, the bandwagon effect model remains a
valid one. Crucially, it provides an explanation of why countries that would
have preferred to remain in full control of their domestic legal system and
institutions —therefore, opposing any change in customary international law
and any attempt to create a treaty on investment— were forced by
circumstance to join the BIT network.
One of the main advantages of this model is how helpful it is in
providing answers to efficiency questions. I use the term efficiency in its
Kaldor-Hicks version (the movement away from domestic law plus
customary international law toward a BIT network, in order to be considered
a Pareto-superior movement, would require that all countries should have i >
i0, a condition obviously too strong to exist in reality). The analytic structure
105

Id.
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Id.
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of Farrell & Saloner demonstrates that this movement might or might not be
efficient from the perspective of developing countries. It is certainly possible
that winners won more than what losers lost. But it is also possible that
losers lost more, and that therefore, it would have been better for the entire
group to stay with the old standard. Ultimately, the solution is empirical in
nature, and would require us to know the values of i for all countries.107
It is worth noting that the movement from domestic law plus
customary international law to BITs may have been inefficient even without
having resulted from a prisoner’s dilemma. In network effect terms, this is a
case of “excess momentum”108: “It is possible that the switch will be made
even though the sum of the benefits is negative. This occurs when one of the
firms [countries] favors the switch and, although the other opposes it
strongly, the latter prefers switching to remaining alone with the old
technology.”109 However, this is only a hypothesis, not a necessary result.
Following the same analysis, we can now invert the roles and compare
the BIT network —now the current standard X— with a potential new
standard Y. One might envision developing countries meeting around the
table (even as a very small group), creating a new BIT-like-minus treaty with
provisions more favorable to them than actual BITs, and then proposing it to
the rest of the world. Why, then, has this not occurred? Aside from the
reality that developing countries lack the bargaining capacity to impose such
a standard on developed countries, the answer may be in part that developing
countries are prone to a situation of “excess inertia,”110 defined as a situation
“that impedes the collective switch from a common standard or technology
to a possibly superior new standard or technology.”111
If two countries belong to the area where i0 ≤ i < i* —area where
Bi(2,Y) > 0— “the switch will not be made, although it would have been
107

The model of Bubb & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 96, 10, in contrast to the model of Guzman, includes
this feature: “The model makes no assumption that capital-importing countries ended worse-off in the full
or partial BIT equilibria relative to the state of the world without any BIT signed”.
108

Farrel & Saloner, supra note 62, 79.

109

Id. at 78-9.

110

Id. at 78.

111

Id. at 71.
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made in a world of complete information and although both firms [countries]
would then be better off. . . The intuition is clear. Both firms [countries] are
fencesitters, happy to jump on the bandwagon if it gets rolling but
insufficiently keen to set it rolling themselves.”112 This result occurs even
more in the case where one country fits the previous description, but the
other is located in the area ī ≤ i < i0: area where Bi(2,Y) < 0. In some of
those cases, the sum of the benefits may be positive, and therefore the switch
—if it had occurred— would have been efficient for the group of developing
countries.113
In other words, countries do not abandon a bandwagon treaty, because
they are “reluctant to give up the bandwagon benefits that they currently
enjoy.”114 Uncertainty about whether other users will follow the same path
impedes them from changing to a more efficient standard, or even making an
effort. Once the extremely high organizational and transactional costs of
concluding a new bilateral or multilateral treaty are taken into account
(particularly when countries with i < ī are also at the table), the failure to
reach such a treaty should be clear.115
Then, setting aside the fact that the OECD Multilateral Agreement on
Investment (MAI) failed mainly due to disagreement among developed
countries as well as developing countries’ nonparticipation in the
negotiations,116 excessive inertia proves that it may not be in the best interest
of any individual state to advance or to ascribe to a new standard, be it
bilateral or multilateral, until enough countries have already done so (unless
the new standard has enough substantial inherent benefits). The BIT virtual
network displays lock-in effects which explain why countries sign BITs and
why, at the same time, they do not make any efforts to reach a new treaty
that may be inherently superior.
112

Id. at 78 (emphasis added).

113

Id.

114

ROHLFS, supra note 55, 43.
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Bubb & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 96, 13, reach a similar conclusion: “Negotiating and concluding a
MAI is a costly process. As the surplus achievable by a MAI narrows, it is less likely that countries will be
willing to bear the transaction costs of creating a MAI.”
116

M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 291 et seq (2004). See also,
David Singh Grewal, Network Power and Global Standardization: The Controversy Over the Multilateral
Agreement on Investment, 36 METAPHILOSOPHY 128 (2005).
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Evidence of the BIT Generation as a Virtual Network

5.1 Five Structural Arguments
This Section presents five structural arguments in favor of the BIT
generation as a virtual network, which seek to prove that the BIT generation
shares many of the typical characteristics of products presenting network
externalities. The first of these arguments is that, as required by the network
effects theory, there exists a “community of interests” among players.117
Following the logic of Guzman and EGS, it is undeniable that there is a
group of developing countries interested in attracting FDI; investments
which presumably must be obtained from a limited common pool controlled
by investors of developed countries. Again, the assumption here is that of
only “weak” competition.
In order to illustrate some of the propositions of this Section and the
next, I will use Chile as a case study. The Chilean case is particularly
interesting because that country was a pioneer in liberalizing its economy;
by the mid-1980s, it had already become internationally renowned in
demonstrating its commitment to property rights and economic liberties
through domestic constitutional and public law. Notwithstanding that reality,
Chile joined the BIT system in the early 1990s. Competition to attract FDI
did in fact play an important role, at least judging from the rhetoric used by
the dominant coalition who were pitching the ICSID Convention and first
BITs to congressmen at the beginning of the 1990s. There were special
concerns about the movement toward economic liberalization in formerly
Communist European countries, as well as the rest of Latin America.118 At
the time, Chile was losing its competitive edge.
117

ROHLFS, supra note 55, 21.
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The discussion in the Chilean Congress constitutes clear evidence of the importance that both the
President of the country and legislators attached to competition among developing countries. See the
following documents relating to the ICSID Convention and the first BIT to be signed by Chile: (1) Mensaje
de Su Excelencia el Presidente de la República con el que inicia un proyecto de Acuerdo que aprueba el
Convenio sobre Arreglo de Diferencias Relativas a Inversiones entre Estados y Nacionales de Otros
Estados, Senado, Sesión 37ª, martes 12 de marzo de 1991, Legislatura 321ª Extraordinaria, 3574-75:
“[V]arios países de América Latina están tratando de salir de las dificultades económicas y políticas que los
afectaron en la década pasada. Estos hechos hacen prever que la competencia internacional por atraer
capitales extranjeros se hará cada vez más difícil y que nuestro país deberá esforzarse para mantener los
índices de inversión extranjera alcanzados. Una condición básica para continuar atrayendo a los
inversionistas es que Chile no pierda ventajas frente a otros países competidores. En este orden de ideas, el
Gobierno ha reestructurado la postura de Chile respecto de tratados que tienen por propósito la protección
de inversiones extranjeros entre los Estados signatarios.. . .”. (2) Discusión General, Senado, Sesión 39ª,
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However, not all developing countries have been ongoing players in
this race, and certainly, not all have displayed the same intensity of
preference for competing/attracting FDI over that relevant period. Indeed,
from 1959 to the mid-1980s, and especially during the period when support
for CERDS was high, a prominent group of countries displayed a very weak
interest in attracting FDI. Instead, they were involved in import substitution
industrialization policies, that made them reluctant to allow foreigners to
own and control any fraction of the national economy. Ideology and strong
political opposition to liberalization and FDI —i.e. low values of i in the
formal model— were real barriers that, again, in hindsight, cast into doubt
the idea of strong competition for FDI.
The second structural argument is represented by the notion of de
facto standardization. As explained in the Introduction, all BITs signed from
1959 up until today, though not identical, have very similar substantive
provisions. The four most important of these —expropriation with
compensation, fair and equitable treatment, national treatment, and most
favored nation— appeared as early as the two first years of the network’s
existence (1959-1961). We have witnessed a clear convergence toward a
“non cooperative standard,”119 one created very early in BIT history.
Indeed, the wording of these provisions remains relatively consistent
across treaties.120 For instance, according to Wälde, the fair and equitable
treatment clause is “a standard that is repeated, more or less identically, in
miércoles 20 de marzo de 1991, Legislatura 321ª Extraordinaria, 3950 et seq., where Senator Navarrete
said: “No obstante, en los últimos dos o tres años, el escenario mundial ha experimentado cambios
importantes que podrían afectar el flujo de capitales extranjeros hacia nuestro país. La competencia para
que los capitales extranjeros concurran a sus respectivos países se hace cada vez más compleja y difícil. . .”
(id. at 3850) and Senator Urenda: “Cabría sí destacar, como lo señala el Mensaje de Su Excelencia el
Presidente de la República, que en este momento hay en el mundo una gran competitividad por atraer
recursos externos. La apertura de la Europa del Este; los cambios en las políticas económicas de
Latinoamérica, y aun el despertar de Africa y los cambios que se producen en Sudáfrica, significan que hay
muchos países que hoy tienen interés en atraer capitales extranjeros” (id. at 3852).
119

Farrell & Saloner, supra note 62, 72 (“One of the clearest features of noncooperative standards setting is
its bandwagon quality. When compatibility is an important consideration for a firm setting its product
specifications, early movers can influence later movers’ decisions.”). Id. at 72 n.5 (“To be clear, what we
have in mind is that those producers who adhere to the standard do so purely because others do so. There is
neither a standard-enforcing authority nor a system of binding though voluntary contracts to adhere to
standards, though both of these possible institutions would be interesting to analyze.”).
120

See supra notes 5, 6, and 8.
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most of the other over 2000 investment treaties in force at present.”121
Furthermore, any small difference in scope and effect may even end up
being erased by the very application of the MFN clause.122
Lawyers —whose practice owes an important debt to language
nuances— could retort that all BITs are different, and that indeed it is not
unusual that BIT awards take the differences among treaties into account.
But this critique does not really contradict the idea of the BIT Generation as
a network. The degree to which all treaties must be similar is a sociological
question; that is, how similar BITs must be in order to be able to have a
common professional practice. Of course, there is a legal component to that
sociological question as well: legal language must show sufficient
commonality to permit that social practice to even exist.
In my opinion, the way that international investment law is practiced
today in the BIT context displays that necessary level of similarity for
network effects. Today, we can talk about a BIT law because there is
already a common professional practice. As indicated in the main empirical
work on BIT precedents available today, “the development of an investment
treaty case law or jurisprudence is unmistakable, and has not gone unnoticed
in recent times, by treaty tribunals, and by those appearing before them.”123
Indeed, there is already a series of BIT awards that have noted this
fact. For example, in Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.Ş. v.
Pakistan, the Tribunal held that “[i]n support of their position, both parties
relied extensively on previous ICSID decisions or awards, either to conclude
that the same solution should be adopted in the present case or in an effort to
explain why this Tribunal should depart from that solution. . . The Tribunal
agrees that it is not bound by earlier decisions, but will certainly carefully
consider such decisions whenever appropriate.”124
121

International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. Mexico (UNCITRAL ad-hoc case), Award (Jan. 26,
2006), separate opinion, para. 25.
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I say “may be erased” and not “are erased” because the proper scope and reach of the MFN clause in
BITs is a contested subject in investment law jurisprudence.
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Jeffrey P. Commission, Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 24. J. INT’L ARB. 129, 129 (2006).
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Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.Ş. v. Pakistán, ICSID Case No. Arb/03/29, Decision on
Jurisdiction (Nov. 15, 2005), paras. 73 y 75. See also ADC Affiliate Limited et.at. v. Hungary, ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/16, Award (Oct. 2, 2006), para. 293 (“The Parties to the present case have also debated the
relevance of international case law relating to expropriation. It is true that arbitral awards do not constitute
binding precedents. It is also true that a number of cases are fact-driven and that the finding in those cases
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The present situation is depicted in Figure 4. The four circles
represent the protection that four different BITs afford to investors. The four
BITs are not identical, but they all share an important area (area X).
Moreover, three of the four BITs still share an additional area (area Y). And,
of course, there are areas that are specific to each BIT (for example, area Z is
unique to BIT D). The relevant point is that the four circles must be
sufficiently close to each other so that area X may be sufficiently broad to
permit the development of a common practice. And again, my impression
and experience —still to be empirically verified— is that this is the case for
BITs.
Figure 4 : Representation of BITs’ similarity

The third structural argument is related to the fact that this “standard”
very much resembles the legal structure of Constitutions: it contains
cannot be transposed in and of themselves to other cases. It is further true that a number of cases are based
on treaties that differ from the present BIT in certain respects. However, cautious reliance on certain
principles developed in a number of those cases, as persuasive authority, may advance the body of law,
which in turn may serve predictability in the interest of both investors and host States”), and Fireman's
Fund Insurance Company v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/02/01, Award (Jul. 17, 2006), para. 172.
In AES Corporation v. Argentine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17, Decision on Jurisdiction (April 26, 2005),
para. 31, the tribunal also held that “one may even find situations in which, although seized on the basis of
another BIT as combined with the pertinent provisions of the ICSID Convention, a tribunal has set a point
of law which, in essence, is or will be met in other cases whatever the specificities of each dispute may be.
Such precedents may also be rightly considered, at least as a matter of comparison and, if so considered by
the Tribunal, of inspiration.”
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extremely open-ended and ambiguous provisions quite wide in scope, which
do not provide immediate answers for resolving cases. And, as Klausner
observed, this lack of determinacy is an essential condition for observing
network effects in the law.
Indeed, the conceptual hurdles and corresponding lack of determinacy
that characterize regulatory takings and State liability are well-known
throughout the world. Furthermore, it is difficult or even impossible to
envision a broader standard than “fair and equitable treatment.” As one
NAFTA Chapter 11 Tribunal has said, “[t]he Article 1110 [of NAFTA]
language is of such generality [the expropriation clause] as to be difficult to
apply in specific cases.”125 Another BIT Tribunal held that “the exact
content of this standard [fair and equitable treatment] is not clear.”126
Although there is not enough space here to explore this idea, BITs are,
in a sense, concise Economic Constitutions that apply to foreign investors.
Because the resolution of cases depends on the jurisprudential developments
among international tribunals, the ultimate payoff of BITs depends not so
much on the text of already concluded BITs, but on the interpretations
adopted by the several awards that we are just beginning to see.127 As with
domestic Constitutions, which are essentially linked to present and future
judicial interpretation, BIT provisions are more likely to have network value
than inherent value.
Of course, as Sweet Stone demonstrates, for this to be the case
previous awards must be at least somewhat valued in BIT adjudication. And,
as previously explained in the second structural argument, this is the case in
BIT law practice. Any recent award, demand or brief contains multiple
references to previous decisions. These decisions prove to play a much more
important role than that of mere citations: they structure the debate and form
in which both the parties and tribunals advance their legal arguments and
reasons. As an aside, it is worth noting that the lack of a central authority as
the WTO Appellate Body in the BIT context, though slowing the impact of
network effects, does not completely erase them.
125

Marvin Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, (Dec. 16, 2002), para. 98.

126

Genin v. Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award, (June 25, 2001), para. 367.
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As mentioned supra note 10, the first BIT award is from 1990.
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The fourth structural argument stems from the fact that BITs are not
the best institutional alternative for foreign investors. If BITs are the product
of competition among developing countries, then that competition still did
not erode all rents for those developing countries. As I have shown before,
there were even more costly alternatives for the latter. Those included what I
have called “BIT-like-plus treaties,” that is, treaties that could have offered
more convenient standards to foreign investors —as the U.S. Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation (FCN) program— and tailor-made contracts
containing ICSID clauses, that would fully extract all rents. In other words,
for investors, BITs are not necessarily the most convenient result of a race to
the top. Indeed, in 1990, when there was no BIT jurisprudence, Detlev Vagts
commented that tailor-made contracts were quite preferable from the
perspective of the investor:
A priori it would seem that such an agreement [BIT], with a clause
providing for resort to the International Court of Justice or an ad hoc
international tribunal, would be comforting to the investor. One does have
the suspicion that specific investor-host contracts would be better at
addressing the specific problems that worry that particular investor.128

Therefore, BITs are clearly not the outcome of a race to the top. Even
if it is true that there was a race between developing countries, the race
ended up neither at the top nor at the bottom. In summary, the history of
BITs cannot be compared to a Bertrand equilibrium in a free market context,
where as a consequence of the free market forces the price ends up equaling
marginal costs, eroding all producer’s rents.129

128

Detlev F. Vagts, Protecting Foreign Direct Investment: An International Law Perspective, in FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE 1990S. A NEW CLIMATE IN THE THIRD WORLD 112, 112 (Cynthia Day Wallace
ed., 1990).
129

As Guzman, supra note 15, 672 n.104, explains: “this situation is referred to as ‘Bertrand equilibrium.’
Under a Bertrand equilibrium, two or more sellers compete with one another by lowering prices. The result
is that prices are driven down to the point at which they are equal to cost. Sellers receive no profit from the
sale because all surplus go to consumers.”
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The fifth and final structural argument is that the historical pattern of
BITs perfectly fits the S-shape diffusion curve of network effect products
(See Figure 5).130 The period from 1959 to 1986-1988 corresponds to the
stage at which the network had not yet reached its critical mass. In that
period, countries concluding BITs were only those that strongly valued BITs
and for whom the sole inherent benefits outweighed all sovereignty costs.131
It is worth noting that during this period, the predominant BIT format did
not have investor-state arbitration (only state-to-state arbitration), and
therefore, had much lower sovereignty costs (see Table 1 below). After the
critical point was reached —sometime between 1986 and 1988— BIT
development began to display a pronounced bandwagon roll. As for other
network products, once a critical mass of users is reached, the effect may, in
fact, be almost unstoppable.132 It seems that the incorporation of China,
Russia, and former Communist countries into the BIT program played an
enormous role in reaching that critical mass. Of course, the U.S.’s adoption
of the BIT program highly influenced this outcome, as well.
Figure 5. The “S-Shaped” BIT diffusion curve

Chance that the
next country joins
the BIT network
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See DIXIT & NALEBUFF, supra note 64, 231.
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ROHLFS, supra note 55, 23-4.

132

Nicholas Economides & Charles Himmelberg, Critical Mass and Network Size with Application to the
US Fax Market, available at http://raven.stern.nyu.edu/networks/95-11.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2006).
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Percentages of countries already joining the BIT network

5.2 Identifying the positive externalities of the BIT system
If the BIT system is really a virtual network, then these treaties’
provisions must display both inherent value and network effects. The idea of
inherent value is straightforward. By signing BITs, countries commit
themselves to protecting foreign investors’ property rights. This signals the
host State’s credibility to investors of the contracting State, and to a lesser
extent, investors of other developed countries. The object is, of course, to
reduce the cost of capital, and therefore to increase FDI.133 But the strength
of this commitment depends at least partially on network effects: investors
will rely on BITs only when they receive assurance that the system works,
and the reliability of that system depends —as I argue here— on the number
of countries joining the system.
With respect to inherent value, it should be noted that BITs do not
replace domestic law and institutions, so their real effectiveness in reducing
the cost of capital —although intuitively the case— is far from being
obvious. From an empirical perspective, the extent to which concluding
BITs reduces the cost of capital in countries that lack political and legal
domestic stability is still not very clear. In fact, there may well exist a
paradoxical situation in which those countries that are more willing to
conclude BITs —those unable to send the appropriate signals of
commitment through domestic institutions and constitutionalism— are the
ones for whom BITs are less effective.134
What then, exactly, are the network effects of BITs? As suggested
earlier, it is possible to discover the same network externalities previously
identified by Klausner in the corporate context. Most of these effects derive
133

See Guillermo Aguilar-Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA
Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 368 (2003).
134

See Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI? Only a Bit. . . and They
Bite, (June 2003), World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3121, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=636541, at 23, and Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment
Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries, (May 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=616242, at 5.
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from the fact that BITs are worded using extremely broad and open-ended
terms. The following four are the main network effects of BITs.
First, there are interpretative externalities. As previously explained,
although arbitral awards applying BITs do not formally carry precedential
value for future cases (future cases regarding the same BIT as well as other
BITs), in practice they have strong persuasive force. In the absence of a
formal doctrine of stare decisis in international law, we can justly speak
about soft precedents in BIT law. As Wälde points out in his separate
opinion in Thunderbird, “while there is no formal rule of precedent in
international law, such awards and their reasoning form part of an emerging
international investment law jurisprudence.”135 Similarly, Duprey remarks
that this soft precedential value specifically permits “the establishment of a
genuine arbitration case law specific to the field of investment.”136 In the
end, future decisions, on the whole, will reduce the high uncertainty of the
BIT standard.
Note that the beneficial character of the interpretative network effects
depends on whether future BIT jurisprudence will stabilize at levels of
protection of investments that are reasonable. To simplify, I envision two
types of BIT jurisprudence crystallization. The first is the good case, which
I refer to as BITs-as-developed countries-constitutional law-and-no-more, in
which BIT jurisprudence recognizes standards of protection of investments
only as high as those which Courts in developed countries apply to their own
nationals. At the other end of the spectrum, the bad case, which I refer to as
BITs-as-gunboat-arbitration,137 corresponds to a libertarian jurisprudence
that is not currently in place in any developed country. In this scenario, BITs
would end up functioning as a kind of insurance for foreign investors, where
all diminutions in value resulting from state action give the latter the right to
be compensated. Undoubtedly, when developing countries concluded BITs
they expected the good case, though they might have anticipated the bad
case as a possible scenario.
135

Thunderbird, Separate Opinion, supra note 121, para. 15. See also, Id. at para. 16 (“While individual
arbitral awards by themselves do not as yet constitute a binding precedent, a consistent line of reasoning
developing a principle and a particular interpretation of specific treaty obligations should be respected; if an
authoritative jurisprudence evolves, it will acquire the character of customary international law and must be
respected.”).
136

See supra note 11.
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I am following the classic characterization of diplomatic protection as “gunboat diplomacy.”
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Second, it is highly probable that the same common practices that
Klausner identifies in the corporate world will eventually infiltrate the BIT
context. Developing countries will begin to treat BIT law as a new layer of
the existing body of law regulating state behavior. BITs will be assumed to
be a new form of global constitutional and administrative law, and experts
on foreign investment law will be consulted on a daily basis by states and
firms about the compatibility of regulatory reform and regulatory behavior
with BIT law.
Third, the quality/price ratio of legal services —both during
bargaining and implementation of treaties— may be substantially increased
by having one basic BIT standard. Consider first the legal cost of bargaining
and drafting. It is precisely the network effects of BITs that have enabled
countries to sign thousands since 1990 without even discussing their terms.
Probably the most dramatic —and amusing— example of this instance is the
experiments conducted by UNCTAD. The organization puts several
developing and developed countries into the same room for a short period of
time, and asks them to conclude treaties.138 At the end of the meeting, thanks
to network effects, they usually conclude a fair number of them.
The cost of research and interpretation is also reduced when a term is
widely used. Lawyers can invest in this transaction-specific asset
(knowledge of BIT law) and having done so, are equipped to deal with
those rules on a long-term basis.139 More treatises, books and law journal
articles are published every year on the topic of BITs. More seminars,
professional gatherings, and even complete courses are dedicated to
investment law in leading law schools all over the world. Top law firms are
increasingly developing new departments and practices focused on
138

See e.g. http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/Event____149.aspx (last visited Apr. 23, 2006), where
UNCTAD explains its strategy: “UNCTAD organized BITs signing ceremonies during UNCTAD X in
2000 and the LDC III Conference in Brussels in 2001. On the occasion of UNCTAD XI, the Secretariat
organized a high-level signing ceremony for Bilateral Investment Treaties in Sao Paulo, Brazil on 15 and
16 June 2004. Six bilateral agreements were signed at the ministerial level by seven countries (Benin,
Chad, Guinea, Lebanon, Lesotho, Mauritania and Switzerland). The BITs were signed by and between:
Benin and Lebanon, Chad and Lebanon, Chad and Guinea, Guinea and Lebanon, Lebanon and Mauritania,
Lesotho and Switzerland.” See also, http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/Event____149.aspx?selected
=context (last visited Apr. 23, 2006).
139

This argument is taken from Romano, supra note 89, 275-76, who explains the impact of legal counsel
in helping Delaware dominate the corporate charter competition.
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investment arbitration.140 In the same vein, there is an increasing number of
experienced arbitrators coalescing around a single body of international
investment law. The accumulated expertise on BIT law should help to
decide cases more efficiently and in a considered way (with the caveat
expressed before, i.e. the good case and the bad case).
Fourth, marketing externalities are extremely relevant in the case of
BITs. Countries wish to attract foreign investors, and the latter must analyze
and price political and regulatory risks. Treatises phrased in idiosyncratic
terms will be priced higher than those using the generally accepted standard
of BITs. Once a certain number of BITs are in existence, the cost of capital
may be lower when adopting a BIT, rather than a different treaty. This may
be true even in the event that some of those idiosyncratic provisions are, on
their face, more favorable to investors.
Probably the best example is the case of political risk insurance. It
seems that, in some cases, political risk insurance premiums have been
priced lower for countries that have signed a BIT with the investor’s home
state.141 In fact, in Chile, this externality was pivotal in its decision to join
the BIT network. In the travaux preparatoire of the Statute approving the
ICSID Convention, the President of the Republic cited this particular
instance of externalities as one of the most important factors that should
move Chile to join the BIT network: “[concluding BITs and the ICSID
Convention] will permit foreign investors to obtain lower insurance
premiums than those actually obtained in the normal situation [without a
BIT]. Therefore, the accession of Chile to this type of treaties would permit
the country to keep itself in an advantaged situation in order to attract
foreign investment.”142 After interviewing the former chief legal officer
140

As STONE SWEET, supra note 9, 41 remarks, “we have good reasons to think that the development of
legal institutions will provoke the development of networks of legal actors specializing in that are of the
law. For these actors, existing argumentation frameworks establish the basic parameters for action.”
141

There is one international institution that provides insurance, MIGA (Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency); several governmental agencies that provide subsidized insurance to their citizens (OPIC in the
U.S., COFACE in France, CESCE in Spain, U.K. Trade & Investment, Netherlands Foreign Investment
Agency, Germany’s KfW Bankegruppe); and, also, private insurance companies (Lloyd’s of London,
Citicorp International Trade Indemnity, Pan Financial, etc.).

142

Mensaje de Su Excelencia el Presidente de la República con el que inicia un proyecto de Acuerdo que
aprueba el Convenio sobre Arreglo de Diferencias Relativas a Inversiones entre Estados y Nacionales de
Otros Estados, Senado, Sesión 37ª, martes 12 de marzo de 1991, Legislatura 321ª Extraordinaria, 3574,
3575: “Los tratados de protección de inversiones tienen dos ventajas para el inversionista: primero,
representan una condición para que operen los mecanismos de seguros públicos de inversión de sus
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(Fiscal) of the Chilean Agency that studied and implemented foreign
investment policies at the time —Comité de Inversiones Extranjeras— I can
corroborate the fact that lower premiums were highly relevant to Chile’s
decision to join the BIT system.143

6.

Providing answers for critical questions

In the Introduction, I identified four key questions that any theory of
the BIT generation must necessarily confront: First, why did all developing
countries adopt more or less the same rules? Second, why did developing
countries adopt the particular set of rules that we see today in BITs, as
opposed to others? Third, why did those rules exist in the “market” for more
than 20 years without being widely adopted? And fourth, why do BITs
constitute an equilibrium that is neither the worst possible scenario for host
States nor the best scenario for investors?
In presenting my theory of the BIT generation as a virtual network, I
already answered the first and last of these questions. Developing countries
have concluded BITs, all worded in closely similar terms, because of the
network effects implicit in a system of such treaties. Furthermore, I have
already shown that the movement from domestic law plus customary
international law to the BIT generation might or might not have been
efficient for the group of developing countries. Even if inefficient, an excess
of momentum would explain such a scenario without the need to have
recourse to a prisoner’s dilemma. Finally, I have identified institutional
arrangements even more costly than BITs —tailor-made contracts with
ICSID clauses and more demanding treaties, such as the U.S. FCN
program— which shows that BITs are not the worst possible case for
developing countries.
In this Section, I will try to answer the two remaining questions. For
that purpose, consistent with the lessons of network externalities, it will be
respectivos países. Esto último permite al inversionista acceder a pólizas de seguro para su inversión a un
costo menor del que deberían afrontar normalmente. De este modo, la incorporación de Chile a este tipo de
tratados permitiría mantener al país en una situación ventajosa para atraer inversión extranjera. En este
aspecto Chile está concediendo actualmente una ventaja en favor de aquellos países que sí han suscrito
estos tratados”.
143

Interview with Roberto Mayorga, Former Fiscal of Comité de Inversiones Extranjeras, in Santiago,
Chile (Nov. 9, 2005). In Chile, the decision whether or not to join the BIT network was assessed by the
Comité de Inversiones Extranjeras.
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necessary to analyze the history and politics of the system in question. As
explained before, an explanation of the equilibrium in these markets requires
referring to “the factors that lead to one outcome or the other.”144 Indeed,
any account trying to explain “the particular equilibrium outcome (among
the multiplicity of eligible candidates) towards which this system converges
must necessarily have recourse to the historical details of its evolution.”145 It
is thus noteworthy that the BIT generation as a virtual network revisits
several classical theories that both Guzman and EGS reject when presenting
their competition model.146
The political-historical account of the BIT system’s development
requires that we separate the two stages of the bandwagon effect: from 1959
to the second half of the 1980s, and then up to the present. As the network
externalities theory predicts, during the first phase only a small group of
“initial users” adopted the standard.147 In our case, only developing countries
that were highly interested in attracting FDI, and those that considered the
inherent value of BITs to be higher than the sovereignty costs involved in
the operation, concluded BITs.
During this period, developing countries that joined the BIT system
only concluded a small number of BITs.148 Indeed, developing countries
individually signed fewer BITs than developed countries; compare the five
developed and developing countries that, in each category, signed the most
BITs in the first twenty years of the network’s history: Germany (45),
Switzerland (32), France (19), Netherlands (15), Belgium (9), versus Egypt

144

See supra note 68.

145

See supra note 70.

146

See Guzman, supra note 15, 667-669. See also, EGS, supra note 15, 826, who label these rejected
theories as “hegemonic, cognitive or idealistic.”
147

ROHLFS, supra note 55, 23 ([the initial user set] corresponds to “individual entities and small groups
(mainly pairs) of entities that that (sic) can justify purchasing the service, even if no other purchase it.”).

148

In the period 1959-1979, the following developing countries concluded two or more BITs: Benin (2),
Cameroon (3), Central African Republic (2), Chad (3), Congo (2), Cote d’Ivoire (5), Ecuador (2), Egypt
(12), Gabon (5), Guinea (3), Indonesia (6), Jordan (4), Korea (7), Liberia (3), Madagascar (4), Malaysia (6),
Mali (2), Malta (3), Mauritius (2), Morocco (6), Niger (2), Pakistan (2), Romania (7), Rwanda (2), Senegal
(4), Singapore (7), Sudan (5), Syria (3), Tanzania (3), Thailand (3), Togo (2), Tunisia (6), Uganda (3),
Yugoslavia (4), and Zaire (4).
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(12), Korea (7), Romania (7), Singapore (7), Malaysia (6).149 At the same
time, the sovereignty costs of signing BITs were much lower than today,
since most treaties did not provide investor-state arbitration (See Table 1).
Table 1: BIT I: treaties that only have state-to-state arbitration clauses; BIT II: treaties
that have investor-state arbitration clauses, but the jurisdiction of such arbitral tribunales
is restricted only to discuss the amount of compensation in case of expropriation; BIT III:
treaties that have investor-state arbitration clauses without restrictions (by year and
cummulative)

Año

Total
BITs
(Year)

1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986

2
1
6
9
7
7
13
6
5
4
5
5
5
6
6
10
6
14
9
15
9
13
12
16
14
18
22
20

BIT I
(Year)
1
1
4
7
5
6
9
5
5
3
1
1
4
5
6
7
2
6
4
7
4
3
3
3
0
5
3
2

(Cum.)
2
6
13
18
24
33
38
43
46
47
48
52
57
63
70
72
78
82
89
93
96
99
102
102
107
110
112

BIT II
(Year)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
0
2
0
2
1
0
1
4
5
6

(Cum.)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
3
3
5
5
7
8
8
9
13
18
24

BIT III
(Year)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
0
0
0
2
3
3
2
4
3
8
6
11
12
7
12
8

(Cum.)

BIT II +
BIT III
(Cum.)

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
3
3
3
3
5
8
11
13
17
20
28
34
45
57
64
76
84

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
3
3
3
3
5
9
14
16
22
25
35
42
53
66
77
94
108

149

Not
reviewed
(Year)
1
0
2
2
2
1
4
1
0
1
3
2
1
1
0
1
0
3
3
1
2
0
2
2
1
2
2
4

When looking at the whole period — 1959-2000 —due to the impact of what happened during the
1990s, EGS, supra note 15, 822, arrive at the opposite conclusion: “[I]t is clear that the distribution of BITs
over the past forty years is significantly more peaked (less uniform) for the host than it is for home
countries. . . The standard deviation of their distributions is also lower for host countries than it is for home
suggesting a more clustered pattern of activity for the host. If BITs are driven by home country programs, it
is not especially apparent in the data.”
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1987
1988
1989

23
30
43

43

0
4
2

112
116
118

5
9
24

29
38
62

11
10
13

95
105
118

124
143
180

7
7
4

As previously noted, this first stage fits reasonably well, to various
degrees, with several of the theories that Guzman and EGS reject when
arguing for their competition model.150 For example, the cases of Korea and
Malaysia may well be explained by “enlightenment theories”, that is, there
were developing countries which understood that they would be better off
under an institutional setting of free market and strong property rights. At
the same time, many of the Asian and African countries that signed treaties
with Germany and Switzerland from 1959 to 1979 may exemplify “powerbased” or “coercive” theories, or perhaps more accurately, trade-off theories
(in which developing countries sign BITs to obtain specific benefits from
developed countries). Indeed, , this was the explanation provided by Rudolf
Dolzer —a prominent scholar in the field— in the early 1980s151, and more
recently provided by Salacuse and Sullivan in 2005.152
In addition, there are three specific aspects of the first historical stage
of BIT development that help us to understand its network aspects. First, as
already mentioned, for countries concluding BITs, the program might have
appeared visibly less expensive in terms of sovereignty costs than its two
main competitors: the U.S. FCN program and the original understanding of
the ICSID Convention (i.e., contracts with ICSID clauses). Not surprisingly,
BITs outperformed both of them.
Second, the BIT programs launched by Germany in 1959, and
Switzerland in 1960, clearly served as a focal point for countries that later
wanted to launch BIT programs, and also signal their commitment to
property rights and economic liberalization. Focal points are extremely
relevant to network products. As Klausner explains, “the factors that make a
contract term focal are matters of perception rather than logic.”153 This
150

As previously noted, I do not reject these classical theories. Indeed, a network theory is particularly
interested in the history of how one standard overcame the others, and those theories play an important role
in this regard.
151

See Rudolf Dolzer, New Foundations of the Law of expropriation of Alien Property, 75 AM. J. INT’L L.
553, 567 (1981).
152

Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 12, 77-78.

153

Klausner, supra note 52, 800.
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includes “historical accidents” of all types. The original German and Swiss
BIT models served as an excellent template: extremely brief, reasonable and
open-ended provisions, and therefore relatively easy to negotiate.
Consequently, countries wishing to pursue property rights and economic
liberties may have found in BITs an easy and inexpensive device to pursue
that objective.154
Third, by the mid-1980s and as recently as the end of that decade,
there were doubts —even among experts— about whether this type of treaty
would survive in the future. This indicates that by that time, the critical
threshold for the bandwagon effect had not yet been reached, or if so,
without anyone’s knowledge. The following comment made by the UN
Centre on Transnational Corporations in 1988 is more than clear on this
point:
[I]n spite of their growing popularity, bilateral investment treaties remain
a limited phenomenon. . . Nevertheless, it is obvious that the present
number of bilateral investment treaties remains far below the number of
treaties that could be concluded by all the countries concerned with such
investment relations, if they were prepared to do so; and although the
number of bilateral investment treaties will no doubt continue to increase
in the coming years, it is doubtful whether the gap [between the actual
number and the number of treaties and could be signed] will ever be
closed.155

The second stage of BIT network development is that in which the
bandwagon effect occurred. As normally occurs with network effect
products, once the critical mass of users has been attained, the effect may be
irreversible. With respect to the BIT context, it seems that the addition of
China and the former Communist countries provided that critical mass in the
1980s. These countries needed to send a clear signal to the world that, at
least in their relations with foreign investors, they had abandoned the
communist political and economic models and were now ready to embrace
154

The signaling function of constitutional law for developing countries is studied by Daniel A. Farber,
Rights as Signals, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 95-97 (2002), and those arguments can be transposed to
international law. In general, for the case of international law, see Beth A. Simmons, Money and the Law:
Why Comply with the Public International Law of Money, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 323 (2000).
155

UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 105106 (1988).
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property rights and contracts. They expected the inherent value of BITs to
help them reduce the cost of capital; accordingly, they began using BITs that
contained investor-State arbitration provisions.
When BITs began to be widely accepted, the calculus for developing
countries changed. For those wanting to attract FDI, BITs now offered not
only the original inherent value of these treaties, but also network benefits. If
they assumed that the network effects would be positive, as it is very
probable that they did, then for many developing countries the net value of
joining the BIT network —BIT inherent plus network benefits less
sovereignty costs— may have began to be positive. For others, it may have
still been better to join the BIT network than to remain isolated by the old
standard of domestic law plus customary international law.
It should be reiterated that there was and still is great uncertainty
about the main variable of this network calculus: whether the jurisprudence
will crystallize at the equilibrium to which I have referred as the good case
(BITs-as-developed
countries-constitutional
law-and-no-more).
Commentators usually overlook the uncertain character of BIT
jurisprudence. As noted before, the first BIT case was decided in 1990. That
same year, Vagts commented that “BITs have not yet been put to the test so
that we do not really know how much they enhance the security of foreign
investment.”156 Still eight years later, UNCTAD affirmed that “it is
nevertheless remarkable that, after nearly 40 years of BIT practice,
information on the experience with the application of BITs still remains
rather sketchy and anecdotal.”157 Yet, given the apparently reasonable
character of the main BIT provisions —ones that resemble the economic
chapters of developed countries’ Constitutions— capital-importing states
during the 1990s might have assumed that the odds favored the good case.
Moreover, during this second stage, countries that did not conclude
BITs may have begun to experience two adverse effects. First, they may
have started to lose FDI from the common pool as it was redirected to
countries concluding BITs; second, they may have been punished for
sending the wrong message to the “market.” As Beth Simmons explains, “as
156

Vagts, supra note 128, 112.

157

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 2, 141. Previously, it affirmed
that “little is known about how individual protection standards have been applied in practice and, and there
are few judicial or arbitral authorities to shed light on this aspect.” (Id. at 140).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007

The Latin American and Caribbean Journal of Legal Studies

46

Vol. 2 [2007], No. 1, Article 6

more countries commit themselves to a rule, non-commitment sends a strong
negative signal.”158 Been & Beauvais recognize the same effect: “signaling
in a competitive market can have a ‘snowball’ effect: As more countries
commit themselves to a particular standard, ‘holdouts’ are more likely to
develop a negative reputation, making it more difficult to attract
investment”.159 Farber, however, explains this effect with the greatest degree
of precision, writing about constitutionalism in terms perfectly applicable to
BITs:
[T]he collective surge by countries toward constitutionalism in regions
like eastern Europe is also explainable on the basis of signaling. If no one
else has adopted constitutionalism, failure to do so may not be particularly
meaningful. When everyone is else in a region is adopting
constitutionalism, however, failure to do so becomes a sharp negative
signal. This signal is particularly important because other countries in the
same region are likely to be in competition for the same sources of
financial and human capital. Thus, being a holdout against a regional trend
can be expensive, and as a result an entire region may shift suddenly into
the constitutionalist column once a tipping point is reached.160

If this account is correct, network effects and the concept of excessive
inertia would explain one of the big mysteries of the BIT generation: why
developing countries suddenly rushed to join the BIT network during the
second half of the 1980s, more than 20 years after the program was created
(i.e., BITs existed in the “market” for a long time without being adopted).161
Similarly, network effects explain, in the terms previously noted, why
developing countries strongly opposed abandoning domestic law plus
158

Simmons, supra note 154, 323.

159

Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s Investment Protections and the
Misguided Quest for an International ‘Regulatory Takings’ Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U.L. REV. 30, 120 (2003)
summarize this perspective: “signaling in a competitive market can have a ‘snowball’ effect: As more and
more countries commit themselves to a particular standard, ‘holdouts’ are more and more likely to develop
a negative reputation, making it more difficult to attract investment”.
160

Farber, supra note 154, 96.

161

Bubb & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 96, 11, recognize how problematic this fact is for all theories that
attempt to explain the emergence of the BIT generation: “An empirical puzzle outside the framework of our
model is the timing of the sudden increase in BIT signings that occurred in the 1990s. Although the first
BIT was signed in 1959, by the end of 1989 there were only 385 BITs in the world economy. However,
from 1990 – 2004 almost 2400 BITs were signed worldwide.”
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customary international law, and why they have rejected the idea of any
multilateral investment treaty. Indeed, network effects show why an
important group of countries —those whose i is such that ī < i < i*— prefer
to stay during time t1 with the old standard (here domestic law plus
customary international law), and switch to BITs only after a reasonable
number of countries have already concluded such treaties. And, furthermore,
there is an important subgroup of countries that switch —those whose i is
such that ī < i < i0— who would have ideally preferred to remain
permanently with the old standard, rather than switch to the new one.
Finally, an important question must be addressed: how does this
model explain the correlation (or lack of) between BITs and FDI? Studies to
date have shown contradictory evidence for the correlation of BITs and FDI,
most of them concluding that there is no correlation, or that it is very
weak.162 But these studies only represent early efforts at measuring this
correlation; as such, they acknowledge that their methodologies to be a
matter of great debate.163
I should add here the following concerns. Comparing all BITs,
without controlling for the type of BIT —i.e., whether they have investor162

There is only one study concluding that BITs fulfilled their expected objective: Neumayer & Spess,
supra note 134, 27 (finding that “[d]eveloping countries that sign more BITs with developed countries
receive more FDI inflows”, particularly in countries with poor institutional quality). But see the following
for the non-clear-effect conclusion: Jennifer Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Foreign Direct Investment
and the Business Environment in Developing Countries: The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties, Yale
Law School, (May 2005), Center for Law, Economics and Public Policy, Research Paper No. 293, available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=557121 (concluding that the relationship between BITs and FDI is weak):
“BITs, by themselves, appear to have little impact on FDI”, Id. at 31; Hallward-Driemeier, supra note 134
(finding that BITs do not lead to increases in DFI); and Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 12, 75 (finding a
positive effect for U.S. BITs, but not for OECD countries’ BITs); and Peter Egger & Micheal Pfaffermayr,
The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment, 32 J. COMP. ECON. 788 (2004)
(concluding that “BITs exert a positive and significant effect on real stocks of outward FDI” but that “the
advantages of simply signing a BIT are inconsequential”, Id. at 801 and 790).
163

Very recently, Jennifer Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Bilateral Investment Treaties: Do They
Stimulate Foreign Direct Investment?, Yale Law School, Draft, (June 2006) (available at
www.upf.edu/dret/civil/clef/sra.pdf, last visited Aug. 23, 2006), after more detailed econometric analysis,
reached different conclusions than in their previous work. They summarized their conclusions in the
following terms: “First, the number of BITs signed by a country (measured in various ways) has a positive
effect on FDI in subsequent periods. Second, the total number of BITs in the developing world (also
defined in different ways) has a positive effect on FDI in individual countries, indicating that there may be
economies of scale in the global regime surrounding the growth of BITs. However, third, the interaction
between these two variables is negative. This indicates that the marginal value of an extra BIT to a country
falls the more BITs exist in countries competing for a limited pool of foreign direct investment. Thus, the
marginal impact of the entry into force of an extra BIT falls as the number of world BITs increases.”
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state arbitration provisions or not— could potentially lead to incorrect
conclusions (i.e., comparing apples and oranges). Also, it would be
interesting to see what results are obtained if we control for the inherent
network benefits of BITs. We still do not know if BITs really had inherent
value; that is, if signing BITs could really reduce the cost of capital and
attract FDI for countries with higher values of i at a time when the BIT
program was not popular (before reaching the necessary critical mass to set
the bandwagon in motion, which occurred between 1959 and the late1980s).164
Similarly, we still do not well understand the correlation between
BITs’ value, and the stability of domestic legal systems and institutions. One
thing is clear: it is false to present the effectiveness of BITs as being
mutually exclusive from domestic law.165 BIT legal design does not replace
domestic law and institutions, but rather, controls them. As Reisman &
Sloan assert, BITs require that developing countries “establish and maintain
an appropriate legal, administrative, and regulatory framework” and
“efficient and legally restrained bureaucracy.”166 We therefore need to know
which countries with high values of i could actually capitalize upon the
alleged inherent value of BIT: all of them, or only those with well
established legal systems and institutions? Only with more empirical
information on inherent value will it be possible to effectively study the
second stage of BIT history and network effects, and thus, the whole BIT
system.
However, this network effects account of the BIT generation may be
problematic in terms of being able to either verify or debunk it (even if the
evidence regarding lower insurance premiums continues to be a solid
empirical argument in its favor). Among other reasons, this occurs because
in network products, a standard may have been adopted due to its focal
properties, which depend more on perception than on logic. Therefore, if this
model is correct, the more relevant factor in the adoption of BITs may have
164

Bubb & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 96, 7, establish their model assuming that “BITs do have a causal
effect on foreign investment, as they enable host states to commit not to expropriate foreign investors.”
165

The strict comparison should be between domestic law plus customary international law, and domestic
law plus BITs.
166

Reisman & Sloan, supra note 3, 117.
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been developing countries’ beliefs about inherent value and network effects
in a particular case, rather than the empirical results that we can now show
ex post about those benefits. In this respect, empirical results that show little
or no correlation between BITs and FDI do not necessarily falsify the theory.

7. Conclusions. Normative Implications of the Virtual
Network Theory of the BIT Generation
The theory advanced here requires detailed empirical study. But I
hope that I have been able to provide sufficient factual arguments for my
belief that a prisoner’s dilemma model is an incomplete, and incorrect,
picture of what occurred during the last 45 years of state responsibility for
injury to aliens. There are collective action problems, but due to the nonsimultaneous nature of the decision to conclude BITs and the presence of
network effects, the resulting game varies considerably from the one
Guzman proposes.
The BIT generation, then, is depicted here as a virtual network of
BITs. Because nearly all are worded in such similar terms, investors and
countries are able to benefit from international investment law, in the form
of a single, unified body of BIT law. As illustrated, it is the anticipation of
that future body of law by the relevant players that constitutes the bulk of
network effects in this case, giving BITs a particular credibility as compared
to more idiosyncratic and lesser known treaties. This is what ultimately
motivated all members of the network to adopt essentially the same
standards.
In conclusion, I would like to emphasize the particular perspective
that is being advanced here. The descriptive model defended in this paper
has substantial implications for those normative questions raised by the
emergence of the BIT generation. A theory in which competition leads
capital-importing states to adopt the same standard treaty, containing no
more than open-ended and reasonable provisions —a suboptimal
equilibrium— appears much more favorable to developing countries than
Guzman and EGS’s account, where countries erode all benefits in their race
to attract investment.
Undoubtedly, when joining the BIT network, developing countries
traded sovereignty for credibility. But as we have seen, this trade-off was
made under essential conditions of uncertainty: as to whether the future BIT-
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case law would crystallize in what may be referred to as the good case
(BITs-as-developed countries-constitutional law-and-no-more) or whether it
would crystallize in what may be referred to as the bad case (BITs-asgunboat-arbitration.)167 Even today, it is not possible to know which case
ultimately prevails. BIT law is continuing to evolve, and remains highly
dependent upon the specifics of each case. But step-by-step, the
jurisprudence is slowly crystallizing. The richness and complexity which
characterizes the legal argumentation today would have been unheard of at
the birth of the process seventeen years ago.
So, under a network effects theory, there is still room for the hope that
the BIT generation will go down in history as a valuable experiment in
global governance, which fosters a fair and just world order. By this I mean,
in the words of Slaugther, “a system of global governance that
institutionalizes cooperation and sufficiently contains conflict such that all
nations and their people may achieve greater peace and prosperity, improve
their stewardship of the earth, and reach minimum standards of human
dignity.”168 My claim is that this goal can only be achieved when
jurisprudence crystallizes according to what I have defined as the good case.

167

I am following the characterization of diplomatic protection as gunboat-diplomacy.

168

ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 15 (2004).
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